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We believe that replicating studies in ecology and
evolution is extremely valuable, but replication within
species and systems is troublingly rare, and even
‘quasi-replications’ in different systems are often
insufficient. We make a case for supporting multiple
types of replications and point out that the current
incentive structure needs to change if ecologists and
evolutionary biologist are to value scientific replication
sufficiently.ity of actual replication in the literature left insufficientThe foundation of cumulative science
Science is largely a cumulative process of building upon
previous findings. For this process to work, we must as-
sume that previous scientific findings are real and replic-
able. Dismayingly, this fundamental assumption may
often be incorrect. Failures of reproducibility in medical
and social sciences have received considerable attention
recently [1, 2], in part because some of these studies had
important implications for human health and society. In
response, high profile replication efforts are currently
underway, most notably in psychology (for example, [3, 4]).
However, the extent to which the disciplines of evolution-
ary biology and ecology will embrace replication remains
to be seen.
In the fields of ecology and evolution (in which we
work), faithful replication is typically difficult because we
study a diverse array of species in a range of often variable
settings. Such difficulties, however, do not diminish the
importance of reproducibility. Two recent meta-analyses
of well-studied systems (zebra finch, Taeniopygia gut-
tata [5] and blue tit, Cyanistes caeruleus [6]) revealed* Correspondence: s.nakagawa@unsw.au.edu
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population-specific, or even more problematically, due
to Type I error. The former meta-analysis, based largely
on a series of replications carried out by the authors,
soundly contradicted previous findings that applying
red colour rings to male zebra finches increased both
their courtship behaviour and body weight, thus enhan-
cing their attractiveness. The latter meta-analysis found
evidence of many practices that inflate error. Further,
despite the publication of dozens of studies of blue tit
colour and many hundreds of statistical effects, the rar-
evidence to support most of the frequently cited claims
regarding the sexually selected role of plumage colour
in this species. These meta-analyses are not the first to
draw such sobering conclusions in our field [7–9]. Low
reproducibility has been recognized as an issue in ecol-
ogy and evolution for a long time, but little has been
done to confront it.
Here, we reinforce and expand upon previous critiques
of replication in ecology and evolution going back many
years [9, 10]. We aim to review major issues and to en-
courage constructive thinking about a future for replica-
tion in our disciplines. We finish by discussing some
specific initiatives, some of which have already been ini-
tiated in social and medical sciences (for example, [11]),
to encourage research replications.What role should replication play in evolution
and ecology?
We believe that replication holds tremendous potential
for promoting scientific progress, though we recognize
that not all work in our disciplines can be replicated and
that not all ecologists and evolutionary biologists agree
that the benefits of replication outweigh the costs [9].
We replicate for two reasons: (i) to assess the validity of
prior findings, and (ii) to probe the generality of those
findings. In ecology and evolutionary biology, we oftenhis article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution
ons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
ive appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to
changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver
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ant, we almost always fail to assess validity of prior find-
ings rigorously. Of course in nature so many variables are
beyond the control of researchers that no study can ever
be perfectly replicated, and in some cases, as with critically
endangered species, replication may be infeasible and even
unethical [12]. Additionally, long-term data sets cannot be
replicated on a whim or with anything short of profound
dedication [13]; though many long-term data sets can
themselves be treated as a series of replications, and
should be valued as such. So where does this leave us?
Although each ecological and evolutionary study is
unique and thus strictly speaking cannot be proven wrong
through replication, this certainly does not make replica-
tion to assess validity of an earlier finding a waste of time.
Across disciplines, there is a continuum of possible pre-
cision in replications, and perfect exact replication (see
definitions below) may typically be unattainable in any
discipline. Thus, we should develop an appropriate un-
derstanding of how replication can assess validity. When a
replication fails to confirm an earlier finding (for example,
red colour rings increase male zebra finch courtship be-
haviour), it may be true that conditions have changed and
both studies were correct in their own contexts. This sce-
nario, however, is no more plausible than the possibility
that either the original study or the replication is incor-
rect. To build confidence in our understanding, we must
conduct multiple robust replications and combine their
results with quantitative research synthesis. The meta-
analysis of zebra finch colour ring effects described above
is an ideal example [5]. Quantitative syntheses will be
best suited to assess validity of an earlier study when
researchers have minimized differences in methods and
environmental conditions, ideally while also systematic-
ally varying conditions hypothesized to influence the study
outcome (see below; [14–16]). This systematic approach
helps us build confidence in tests for validity while simul-
taneously initiating the process of circumscribing the
generality of the phenomenon. We can never be certain
that an aberrant study was incorrect. Yet, with enough
robust contradictory evidence, we can treat it as incor-
rect or at least as insufficiently general to merit further
consideration. To return to the zebra finch example,
when four replications fail to find an effect of ring colour
on male courtship rate and body mass, it becomes reason-
able to discount the original claim that ring colour influ-
ences male zebra finches in these ways [5]. We address
the goal of determining generality below.
Scientific replication and generality
Traditionally, three main levels of replications are recog-
nized; exact, partial and conceptual [10]. We follow Palmer
[9] and include quasi-replication (cross-species or system),
though we point out that quasi-replications can also varyfrom partial to conceptual. The first level, exact (sometimes
also known as ‘direct’ [17]) replication, provides the highest
fidelity to the original work. As mentioned above, given the
complexities of the systems in ecology and evolutionary
biology, exact replication is never perfectly attained and so
attempts at exact replication are, at best, ‘close’ replications.
Partial replications fall along a spectrum, from these ‘close’
replication to replications that include limited procedural
or methodological differences. The four replications of the
zebra finch colour ring work should be considered partial
(but close) replications, despite the authors’ effort to repli-
cate the original work precisely, because the breeding
history of animals and the details of rearing conditions
differed from those of the original study and among the
replicates [5]. As explained above, however, differences
were slight enough to allow us to reject the validity of
the original finding based on the replications.
While a close replication attempts to duplicate experi-
mental methods, a conceptual replication uses a distinctly
different study designed to test the same hypothesis [17].
For instance, two studies presented reasonable tests of the
hypothesis that male plumage colour in blue tits signals
potential aggression towards conspecific males [18, 19], but
they did so with dramatically different methods (captive
versus wild, response to live threats versus taxidermic
mounts, different measurements of aggression, and so on).
If both of these studies had found that male plumage
colour predicted male aggression, we would have gained
confidence in the original hypothesis. As it is, one study
supported this hypothesis and the other did not. Because
these studies should be considered conceptual replicates,
the differences in results between them could either mean
that one of the studies was in error, or that both studies
were correct in the context of their methods [6]. The latter
case would mean that more narrowly defined hypotheses
reflecting the set of conditions imposed by each experi-
ment could be true even if the original, more broadly
defined, hypothesis described above were not true.
These new hypotheses would, however, require further
testing [6].
Because conceptual replications are defined simply as
distinct tests of the same hypothesis, the definition of the
hypothesis is the only factor constraining what we con-
sider a conceptual replication. To continue with the blue
tit example from the previous paragraph, we could re-
define the hypothesis as ‘male plumage colour in blue tits
is a signal used in conspecific interactions’, in which case
we would also want to consider, for example, responses to
this putative signal by females in studies designed to assess
mate choice. Alternatively we could expand in other di-
rections, for instance by hypothesizing that ‘male pheno-
typic traits signal potential aggression towards conspecific
males’, thus allowing us to consider traits other than plum-
age colour.
Nakagawa and Parker BMC Biology  (2015) 13:88 Page 3 of 6We may wish to expand our scope beyond the original
species or system with quasi-replication [9]. It could be
useful to conduct a quasi-replication in which we match
methods from the earlier study. This form of partial
replication would allow any differences in results to be
more confidently attributable to differences between spe-
cies or systems rather than to different methods. However,
most quasi-replications are conceptual in nature and
make no effort to match methods. Thus, like conceptual
replication within species, these replications can help de-
fine generality, but when results conflict, we cannot draw
robust inferences about why this may be. Most large
meta-analyses published today in evolutionary biology and
ecology combine quasi and conceptual replications. These
analyses thus help us determine generality of phenomena
(within limits; see below), but without close replications
within systems and species, these analyses are not effective
at assessing validity of published findings. In Table 1, we
summarise the relationship between levels of replica-
tion, assessment of validity, and establishment of scien-
tific generality.
Replications, regardless of level, should all be welcome.
Quantitative synthesis of empirical studies (meta-analysis)
relies on availability of many replications; the statistical
toolboxes of meta-analysis are equipped to help identify
potential selective reporting as well as generality [14–16].
As should be clear, individual replications entail a trade-off
between levels of generality and tests for validity (Table 1).
Thus, all levels are valuable in their own way and the
choice of a level would seem to rest with the researcher’s
goals. However, robust inferences about generality require
sound inferences about validity so replications should
ideally be performed in order starting with close replication
and only later moving to conceptual and quasi-replication.
The desirability of first replicating at the exact (or more
realistically, close) level has been recognized for some
time. Palmer [9] laid out the case that quasi-replication,
although useful, if used alone is not a robust method
for a determining cross-species or cross-system generality.
First, as we discussed above, no replication can definitely
prove an earlier study wrong, but close or rigorous partial
replication is often the only effective tool for identifying
results that are likely wrong. Thus, a series of strictly
quasi-replications (for example, across species or sys-
tems) cannot actually determine whether a hypothesisTable 1 The different levels of study replication in relation to establ
Replication level Testing validity Scope of generality
Exact (close) replication Excellent Narrowly defined biolo
Partial replication Good Fairly narrowly defined
Conceptual replication Poor Species- or system-spe
Quasi-replication (partial) Poor Narrowly defined biolo
Quasi-replication (conceptual) Poor Broadly defined biologis supported or contradicted in any of the given species
or systems included. Further, high-level replications
(that is, quasi- and conceptual replications) are prone
to misuse because, unlike exact or close replications,
researchers can decide which data to analyse and what
to report. Unfortunately, this kind of ‘researcher degrees
of freedom’ [20] seems pervasive across many scientific
fields [21]. Simonsohn and colleagues [22] recently termed
the practice of selective analysis and reporting (researcher
degrees of freedom) ‘p-hacking’, which is distinct from
traditional publication bias (where non-significant results
are less likely to be published) because p-hacking is a suite
of potentially deliberate acts that bolster a researcher’s
chance of finding significant p values. Thus, we expect a
collection of quasi-replications to be a biased collection of
studies that will produce a biased average effect in re-
search synthesis. On the other hand, if the effect from
each species or system derives from a series of close repli-
cations, we will have substantially more confidence in the
patterns within each species or system, and thus substan-
tially more confidence in the overall effect derived from
cross-species (or system) synthesis.
However, the meaning of quasi-replication is not as
clear as it first appears. Within a species, populations
differ from each other in multiple ways. Just as with dif-
ferent results in different species, when results differ be-
tween two populations of the same species, we cannot
distinguish real population differences from some sort of
error. We do not claim to have a definitive answer to the
conundrum of where to draw the boundaries of quasi-
replication. However, we do have some thoughts on this
matter. First, we repeat our assertion that the closer a rep-
lication conforms to the original study in methods and ex-
perimental conditions, the more valuable that replication
is for assessing the validity of the original. Further, clear
thinking about the scope of intended inference can help
us determine what sort of replication is needed. If we are
testing the generality of a phenomenon within a species,
then among-population replication is useful and may be
sufficient. If we simply wish to know whether the plumage
of male blue tits reflects more light in the UV than does
the plumage of female blue tits, regardless of population,
then a series of different studies in different populations is
fine. However, if we wish to draw robust conclusions
about among-population differences, then we need toishing validity and generality
gical phenomenon limited to a population, strain, or locality
biological phenomenon mostly limited to a population, strain, or locality
cific phenomenon, broadly defined
gical phenomenon across species or system
ical phenomenon across species or systems
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interest [6]. Some studies have found greater sexual di-
morphism in blue tit plumage colour than have others
[6], but we cannot attribute this difference to biological
differences in populations since we lack sufficient repli-
cates to assess the validity of these differences.
It is worth pausing here to acknowledge that not only
might we expect results to vary geographically within a
species, we also can expect results to vary from year to
year due to real temporal variation in biological processes
(for example, [23], but see [24]). Such variation presents
serious challenges to replication [6]. However, if we find a
result in one year and not in another, we cannot robustly
infer temporal variation without replication. Often re-
searchers understand their system well enough to expect
different process between, for instance, wet and dry years.
In this example, confirming differences in replicate wet
and dry years will add substantial inferential strength. In
some situations, replication within divergent conditions
will be very difficult. Thus, we will have to accept a lower
level of confidence in our inference.
Another reason to promote within-species or within-
system replications is that although we value broad gen-
erality of research findings, we readily acknowledge that
idiosyncratic or species-specific findings can have im-
portant implications. For instance, it appears unique that
naked mole rats, Heterocephalus glaber, do not suffer
from cancer. It is this idiosyncrasy that possibly carries a
huge potential for cancer treatment [25]. Medical signifi-
cance aside, population-specific adaptations of a particu-
lar species can be of great interest to evolutionary
biologists as they often provide clues to a bigger ques-
tion on the process of evolution.
Note that we have not provided a comprehensive ana-
lysis of replication above. There are many more chal-
lenges we have not explored and replication strategies
that we have not explained. However, we have attempted
to lay out the basic case in favour of replication.
Although all forms of replication have value, they are
not all equally common. Various forms of conceptual and
quasi replication are much more common than close or
careful partial replications [9, 10]. Given the importance
of close replication to building a foundation of under-
standing within species and systems, our highest priority
right now is to shape incentive structures to promote
systematic close replications.
Initiatives for replicative and reproducible
research
We recently reviewed initiatives in medical and social
sciences to encourage replication and to discourage se-
lective reporting such as publication bias and p-hacking;
the former and the latter are intertwined as selective
reporting influences reproducibility of research [26].Four notable examples of initiatives in other disciplines
are: (i) the development of a set of unified standards to
increase reproducibility, taken up by many journals in
biomedical sciences [27] and psychology [11], (ii) sys-
tematic efforts to coordinate, fund, and publish replica-
tions [28], (iii) the use of ‘registered reports’ to review
proposed replications prior to gathering data and guar-
antee publication of accepted proposals independent of
outcome [29], and (iv) non-profit organizations awarding
‘badges’ for reproducibility [29]. The field of ecology
and evolution, as a whole, has yet to unite for similar
initiatives.
Fifteen years ago, Palmer argued that three groups of
people would need to come together to establish a cul-
ture of replications in ecology and evolution [9]. These
groups are editors, funders, and supervisors (or principal
investigators). However, it is important to remember as
we discuss these that the first two groups play a major
role in establishing the incentive structures that shape the
choices of the third group, the principal investigators.
Journal editors can provide an incentive to replicate by
creating journal sections dedicated to publishing replica-
tion work. As simple as this suggestion seems, no journals
in ecology and evolution have had such a section until
now. To our delight, the renowned evolutionary biologist
John Endler is initiating a new section, named ‘New Tests
of Existing Ideas’ in the journal Evolutionary Ecology [30].
What is more, the best paper published in this new sec-
tion will be awarded a prize named after R.A. Fisher, a
father of modern evolutionary biology and statistics and a
strong believer in replicating experiments. We hope other
ecological and evolutionary journals will follow this ex-
ample. With many journals moving online, the old excuse
of limited journal space should fade as an obstacle to pub-
lishing replicative research. The effectiveness of this incen-
tive for replication will presumably be stronger as more
journals, especially those with high impact factors, adopt
replication sections.
As high status outlets for publishing excellent replica-
tions emerge, the idea of professors or institutions requir-
ing some replication of previous work as a part of every
PhD thesis becomes more plausible [9, 10]. It is eminently
sensible to ask a student to replicate a key study that
constitutes part of the foundation of a given PhD thesis.
To make this scenario more common, support from
PhD supervisors and universities will be essential, along
with incentives from the broader scientific community.
The possibility of publishing replications in high-impact
journals is an ideal incentive for toiling away at the task.
Like it or not, the value of scientists is often measured by
publications in high-impact journals, especially for those
who have yet to land a permanent job [31].
Equally important, replication needs funding, which in
our field is awarded almost exclusively for novel scientific
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and most immediate influence on our attitude towards
replication. Researchers will scramble to replicate when
money is set aside for this purpose [9]. Funding agencies
could promote replication batteries through collaboration
on simultaneous replications across different laboratories
[3]. Such collaborative projects could be an effective path
towards replication for ecologists and evolutionary biolo-
gists. Researchers could work together to test hypotheses
on the same, closely or distantly related species in a stan-
dardized manner [32], ideally via a registered reports
framework [28]. Another idea is for agencies to evaluate
reproducibility of foundational studies as a criterion for
awarding research funding [6] or to provide funds for rep-
lications of previous research as part of grants for novel
work. Of course, replications may contradict previous
work, in which case scientists would need to step back
and further investigate foundational ideas. In so doing,
they would avoid wasting time and money on projects
resting on unsound foundations. Changing funding proto-
cols may not be as easy as adding replication sections to
journals. However, it is up to us to push funding agencies
in this direction.
Allocating resources to robust replication presumably
will divert resources from other projects. Some will argue
that this diversion is foolish. Instead, we believe it is fool-
ish not to invest in substantiating important studies.
Failing to invest in replication means that too often we
will instead invest in novel studies resting on flawed
foundations, and that is clearly a poor investment. We
invested in the original studies because they held the
potential of answers worth knowing. If we really do
want these answers, then we need replication.
Finally, we return to the question of whether evolu-
tionary biologists and ecologists will be able to increase
the rate of replication sufficiently to improve the quality
of inferences in our disciplines. In theory, replication at
any level should be extremely valuable as a fundamental
part of cumulative science. The real questions are whether
ecologists and evolutionary biologists as a community
value replication and are willing to promote it despite the
obvious obstacles. We hope that we can convince a suffi-
cient number of our colleagues that the potential gains
in the quality of scientific inference from replication are
worth the costs. We will continue to work for shifts in edi-
torial policies, graduate training programs and research
funding priorities [9].
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